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Résumé / Abstract
On étudie un modèle qui montre que l'intermédiation active des institutions
financières peut générer les fluctuations. Il s'agit d'un modèle aux générations
imbriquées avec un stock de capital. Les individus sont riscophobes, tandis que les
institutions financières (I.F.) ne le sont pas. On considère deux cas. Dans le
premier cas, les I.F. sont actives : elles prêtent de l'argent sous la condition que les
emprunteurs acceptent des restrictions sur leurs choix de projets d'investissement.
Dans le deuxième cas, les I.F. sont passives. Nous démontrons que si les I.F. sont
actives, les conditions de prêts peuvent créer un effet de richesse qui peut générer
les fluctuations du taux d'investissement, et du P.I.B.
We construct a model to show that active financial intermediation can
induce economic fluctuations. We embed a financial sector in a simple
overlapping generation model with a single stock of capital. Individuals are risk
averse agents that face idiosyncratic risks in their business activities: Due to
limited liability, agents have incentives to invest in a technology that produces
high output with a smaller probability. Financial intermediaries (FIs) are risk
neutral. We distinguish two scenarios. The first scenario is one with “active
financial intermediation”: the FIs lends only on the conditions that borrowers
accept restrictions on their investments. In the second scenario, financial
intermediation is “passive”, in that the FIs lend without monitoring the activities
of the borrowers. For a given loan size, the investment level under active financial
intermediation is shown to be smaller than under passive financial
intermediation. This fact alone creates, in the first scenario, an income effect that
may generate fluctuations in investment. (This effect is absent under passive
financial intermediation, and, as a result, in our model there are no fluctuations
under passive financial intermediation.) Thus business cycles and possibly chaotic
dynamics can be, under certain conditions, generated by active intermediation.
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1 Introduction
Monitoring the degree of risks of the projects undertaken by borrowers and
providing insurance against idyosyncratic shocks to depositors are two pri-
mary functions performed by nancial intermediaries (FIs). The monitoring
role of the FIs primarily stems from the limited liabilility clause embedded
in debt contracts. The clause stipulates that in the event of default, borrow-
ers' obligations are limited. Since borrowers' interests in the event of default
are protected, they tend to undertake excessively risky project, giving rise
to potential conicts with lenders regarding the choice of project risk. The
FIs tend to counteract such moves by resorting to capital rationing. Many
authors have investigated this phenomenon in a partial equilibrium context.
An equally important role of nancial intermediary is to provide assets to its
depositors that shield income against idyosyncratic shocks. In an environ-
ment where risk-averse agents face idiosyncratic income shocks, it is plausibe
to think that FIs would naturally arise to provide eÆcient risk-sharing. Af-
ter all, a well-diversied intermediary, assured by the law of large numbers,
would achieve complete risk sharing in such an environment.
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Hence, reduc-
tion of the project risks undertaken by the borrowers through the restrictions
in the use of capital as well as provision of loan that helps agents smooth
out consumption across dierent states of nature are the twin objectives of
nancial intermediaries.
In this paper, we show that fullment of both objectives (capital rationing
and consumption loans) can expose the economy to non- linear uctuations,
including chaos and cycles. The intuitive reasoning is as follows: Suppose
that the technology available to individuals for converting an investment into
a ow of nal goods is risky, and they can aect the risk by the choice of
investment. In particular, if a higher investment level is associated with a
greater level of output but with a lower chance of success, there is a potential
conict between lenders and borrowers, given that the project is nanced by
debt. In this type of situation, agents tend to undertake a risky project
which generates a very high output with a smaller probability because in
the event of sucess, they can keep the surplus while in the event of failure,
loss is minimal due to limited liability. If investment level can be observed
1
It has been argued that the FIs perform several other important functions, such as
delegated monitoring, etc. A fuller description of these functions is available in Pagano
(1993). In this paper, we focus on the risk-sharing role of nancial intermediaries.
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(via monitoring), nancial intermediaries may want to restrict the size of
investment so that risk is reduced. On the other hand, provision of insurance
requires disbursement of loans so that consumption is fully smoothed out
across dierent states of nature. These two features imply that the amount
of loan that agents will receive for smoothing out consumption will exceed
the amount of investment in the risky projects that they undertake. We will
show that this creates a wealth eect and can generate non-linear uctuations
in output over time via its eect on savings.
The source of uctuations in our model is the income eect (or wealth
eect) that is induced by the optimal contracts. This is distinct from a more
well-known source of uctuations that has been discussed extensively in the
literature on chaos, namely, the structure of preferences. Suppose there is a
fall in the aggregate capital stock. Agents will receive a smaller wage and
this will tend to depress savings and investment. On the other hand, such a
fall in the capital stock will enhance the probability of success and will lead
to a lower borrowing rate and disbursement of a higher volume of loans. The
second eect is the wealth eect (captured in lemma 2 below) and we show
below that only the existence of an active nancial intermediation regime can
generate such eects that usher in non-linear uctuations in capital stock and
output.
The economy we study is similar in some respects to the one explored
in Azariadis (1993). In particular, the setting is a production economy in-
habited by overlapping generations of risk-averse agents. There is a single
nal good produced according to a standard neoclassical production function
using capital and labor as inputs. In contrast to the specications of the s-
tandard neoclassical growth model, however, there is one major modication.
Here, at the micro-level, individuals face idiosyncratic risks, represented by
two states: success or failure. The probability distribution of the uncertain
future output generated by an investment project depends on the amount
of capital invested by the agent. Capital then has a dual role: on the one
hand, more capital investment decreases the probability of success with the
output technology (henceforth \project"), while on the other hand, through
standard channels, more capital means more output in the success state.
We distinguish between two types of intermediation regimes: passive and
active. A passive intermediation regime is one where intermediaries lend
indiscriminately and do not interfere in any way with the activities of the
borrowers. In contrast, an active intermediation regime is characterized by
intermediaries that lend only to borrowers who accept restrictions on their
2
own actions as stipulated by the intermediary within the context of a contrac-
tual arrangement. This distinction is entirely analogous to and reminiscent
of the dierence between publicly-placed debt and bank debt as discussed
in Rajan (1992).
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In the public-debt market, there are numerous creditors;
consequently, no single creditor has any incentive to monitor the borrower
(\passive intermediation"). Public debt therefore is an \arms-length" con-
tractual relationship. On the other hand, in the private-debt market, a bank
or a consortium of banks, being a single party, has a bigger stake in the
lending. Hence, lending agreements typically contain loan covenants which
are contractual restrictions imposed on the behaviour of the borrowing rm.
These restrictive covenants (\active intermediation") induce a borrower to
undertake potentially costly actions which would otherwise not have been
taken had the decision been left solely to the borrower. Such a distinction is
routine in the corporate nance literature.
In both intermediation regimes, agents seek to borrow funds in order to
make capital investments on their projects. At the same time, they set a-
side some wealth in the form of deposits with nancial intermediaries which
promise them a safe default-free rate of return. In this complete information
world, contractual credit arrangements are such that complete risk-sharing
is achieved; i.e., all agents enjoy a non-stochastic consumption stream over
their lifetimes. We show that in the passive intermediation regime, an agen-
t will, of his own accord, invest in his idiosyncratic risky project the entire
amount of the loan he receives. His capital investment is therefore completely
nanced by outside public debts. In sharp contrast, in an active intermedia-
tion regime, eÆcient risk sharing will require that an agent invest less than
the amount of loan he receives. Thus, for a given loan size, in an active in-
termediation regime (private debt regime), agents are required to invest less
than in the passive regime.
We will establish that, in the context of our model, in a passive interme-
diation regime, the law of motion for the capital stock is strictly monotonic,
while in an active intermediation regime, the law of motion for the capital
stock may be nonmonotonic, with the possibility of endogenous cyclical uc-
tuations and chaotic dynamics. Put dierently, economies with a passive
intermediation regime are immune to endogenous uctuations while those
with an active intermediation regime are not. In the latter case, the ratio of
2
While Rajan (1992) focuses on the costs of bank debt in an asymmetric information
environment, ours is a complete information setting with idiosyncratic risks.
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internal funds to total capital investment may also exhibit cyclical uctua-
tions.
The possibility that nancial intermediation in and of itself may expose
an economy to endogenous uctuations has been recognized earlier in the
macroeconomics literature. Friedman (1960) in fact advocated 100% reserve
requirements on nancial intermediaries as a sure step towards eliminating
such uctuations. Smith (1991) and Woodford (1990) have examined the
validity of Friedman's proposal in a world with nancial intermediaries and
nominal assets. Schreft and Smith (1997) establish the existence of com-
plex dynamics within the context of a monetary growth model with active
nancial intermediaries. Allen and Gale (1997) consider the role of nan-
cial intermediary in an overlapping generation framework where markets are
not complete. In their model, nancial markets help agents to smooth out
consumption across time; and they focussed on welfare comparisons between
nancial markets and nancial intermediaries. In our set-up, while both
passive nancial markets and active nancial intermediation help agents to
smooth out idiosyncratic shocks, it is active intermediation that leads to en-
dogenous uctuations of economic activity. To the best of our knowledge, the
issue of whether nancial intermediation can induce real endogenous cyclical
uctuations has not been explored in the literature.
It is also important to emphasize that these cycles emerge in a relatively
standard economy; in particular, we do not rely on factors such as limit-
ed market participation, imperfect competition, multiple sectors etc., which
have been shown to contribute to cyclical uctuations (see Boldrin andWood-
ford (1990) for a survey). We do however rely on of the \income eect" (or
more appropriately, the \internal equity eect" in our case) in the gener-
ation of cyclical uctuations, although it should be noted that the nature
of the income eect we describe is very dierent from the one explored in
Azariadis (1981) or Grandmont (1985), who both stipulated restrictions on
preferences so as to generate a suÆciently strong income eect which in turn,
produces \backward-bending" savings/labor-supply functions. In our set-up,
however, the income eect is endogenously generated. Active intermediaries
require agents to invest less than the loan they provide for smoothing out
consumption. This is the source of the income (internal equity) eect.
3
3
The strength of this eect depends on the curvature properties of the probability
density function describing future uncertain output.
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2 The Model
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, which we represent by the real interval
[0; 1]. The measure of this continuum is 1. The generic entrepreneur is
denoted by the index  2 [0; 1]. There is also a continuum of workers, with
measure 1. Each worker inelastically supplies a xed amount of labor. The
total supply of labor by the continuum of workers is assumed to be 1.
An entrepreneur who plans to produce in period t + 1 must invest in
period t. The amount that entrepreneur  invests in period t is denoted by
K
t+1
(). The outcome of the investment is subject to a random event, which
is idiosyncratic. (One may think of the project as an R&D activity). At
the beginning period t+1, the uncertainty is resolved, and the entrepreneur
then knows whether his investment project is a success or a failure. If it is a
failure, the amount invested, K
t+1
(); becomes useless, and he will not hire
any worker. If it is a success, he will go to the labor market to hire labor at
the given wage rate W
t+1
, and his rm's output is
Y
t+1
() = F (K
t+1
(); N
t+1
())
where N
t+1
() is the amount of labor hired, and F (:; :) is a neoclassical pro-
duction function, with constant returns to scale. Given K
t+1
(), the owner of
the successful project will choose N
t+1
() to maximize his prot, by equating
marginal product of labor,F
N
, to the wage rate W
t+1
. This implies that his
rm's capital labor ratio, denoted by x
t+1
() = K
t+1
()=N
t+1
(); satises the
equation
f(x
t+1
())  f
0
(x
t+1
())x
t+1
() =W
t+1
(1)
where f(x
t+1
())  F (x
t+1
(); 1). Equation (1) yields x
t+1
() as a function
of W
t+1
. We denote this function by (:) :
x
t+1
() = (W
t+1
) (2)
where 
0
(:) > 0 . After making payments to labour, the successful en-
trepreneur gets the residual , where
  f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
(): (3)
For example, if F = K

N
1 
, then
x
t+1
() =

W
t+1
1  

1=
= (W
t+1
) (4)
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Inverting, we get
W
t+1
= x

t+1
(1  ):
The probability that entrepreneur  is successful is assumed to be depen-
dent on the amount he invests, and is denoted by p(K
t+1
()). The probability
that he is unsuccessful is 1  p(K
t+1
()).We assume that 1  p(0) > 0 and
that p(:) has negative derivative: p
0
(K
t+1
) < 0. This assumption on p
0
is analogous to that made by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 399-400), and de
Meza and Webb (1999, 135). Basically, our assumption states that a higher
K
t+1
implies a greater total return, if the project is successful, as indicated
by (3), but also a higher probability that the project will be unsuccessful.
Large investment projects usually involve higher degrees of complexity, and
therefore a greater probability of failure. (We could have introduced a risk-
characteristic parameter ! and let p = p(!) and let output in the success
state be an increasing function of !; the added complexity is not worthwhile,
because basically our essential results remain unchanged.)
In what follows, we assume that all entrepreneurs choose the same level
of investment, that is K
t+1
() = K
t+1
(
0
) for all  and all 
0
. (We will
thus drop the index  when there is no ambiguity.) Even though there is
uncertainty at the individual level, in the sense that no entrepreneur knows
in advance whether he will be successful, we take it that there is complete
certainty in the aggregate. By this, we mean that if all entrepreneurs invest
the same amount K
t+1
, then the measure of successful entrepreneurs (i.e.,
the fraction of rms that are successful) is exactly p(K
t+1
); and therefore,
after individual entrepreneurs observe their idiosyncratic random events, the
economy's overall capital-labor ratio is p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
=1 (recall that p(K
t+1
) is
the fraction of rms that survive, and the measure of labor is 1.) It follows
that for the successful entrepreneur, his rm's capital labor ratio is
x
t+1
= p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
=1 (5)
From equations (2) and (5), we obtain
p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
= (W
t+1
) (6)
This equation tells us that, given the investment level K
t+1
undertaken by
all entrepreneurs, the market-clearing wage rate in period t + 1 is uniquely
determined.
We now turn to the problem of how investment decisions are made. This
depends on nature of the credit market, and on the entrepreneur's utility
function.
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We assume that each individual's life span consists of two periods. In
the rst period, he supplies one unit of labor, and earns the wage income
W
t
. He can borrow from the nancial intermediaries (FIs) an amount B
t
;
and consume the amount C
y
t
(where the superscript y indicates consumption
when the consumer is young). The dierence (W
t
+B
t
)  C
y
t
is carried over
to the next period, by (a) investing an amount K
t+1
in his own rm (a risky
activity), and (b) investing an amount S
t
in a safe asset (such as a bank
deposit insured by the government.) Thus the rst period budget constraint
is
C
y
t
= (W
t
+B
t
) K
t+1
  S
t
:
By investing S
t
in the riskless asset, in period t + 1 he gets back r
t+1
S
t
,
where r
t+1
is 1 + i
t
, and i
t
is the net rate of interest on the safe asset. We
call r
t+1
the gross rate of return on the safe asset, or simply the \safe rate
of return". (We will show later that this rate is endogenously determined.)
The investment in the risky activity K
t+1
may turn out to be a success, or a
failure, as mentioned above.
If the risky project turns out to be a success, (i.e., the state of nature is
\good") the entrepreneur will have to pay to the FIs the contracted amount
R
t+1
B
t
where R
t+1
is the gross rate of interest on the risky loan. If the
project is unsuccessful, (i.e., in the bad state) he will pay the FIs nothing
(this reects the limited liability feature of the loan contract). We will soon
discuss how R
t+1
is determined.
The individual's second period consumption in the \good state" is
C
oG
t+1
= r
t+1
S
t
+ f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
  R
t+1
B
t
(where o indicates the old age consumption, and G indicates the good state).
In the \bad state",
C
oB
t+1
= r
t+1
S
t
because in the bad state, his rm is a complete failure, and under limited
liability, he pays the FIs nothing.
Note that if W
t
;W
t+1
; r
t+1
; K
t+1
, R
t+1
and B
t
are given, the consumer's
choice of S
t
must maximize
U
1
[W
t
+B
t
 K
t+1
  S
t
] + [1  p(K
t+1
)]V
2
[r
t+1
S
t
]
+p(K
t+1
)V
2
[r
t+1
S
t
+ f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
  R
t+1
B
t
]
7
where U
1
(:) is the utility function for the rst period, and V
2
(:) is the util-
ity function for the second period. This maximization problem yields the
function
S

t
= S [W
t
;W
t+1
; r
t+1
; K
t+1
; R
t+1
; B
t
] :
3 Financial contracts under active interme-
diation
Financial intermediaries (FIs) pay depositors the safe rate r
t+1
(in period
t+1) for each dollar they borrows from depositors in period t. The FIs lend to
entrepreneurs, and the expected return from each dollar lent is p(K
t+1
)R
t+1
,
where K
t+1
is the amount invested by the representative entrepreneur. The
FIs are perfectly competitive, and risk neutral. Zero expected prot for the
FIs implies
p(K
t+1
)R
t+1
= r
t+1
Now the FIs must design the loan contract that they oer to the en-
trepreneurs. In this section, we consider the case of \active intermediation":
the FI that lends to entrepreneur  actively monitors the entrepreneur, in
the sense that it observes the amount K
t+1
() that entrepreneur  invests in
the risky project. The eÆcient contract must maximize the expected utility
of the entrepreneur, given the limited liability constraint, and subject to zero
expected prots for the FIs. It is as if the FIs were to tell the entrepreneurs
how much they should borrow, how much to invest in the risky asset, how
much to invest in the safe asset, and how much to consume in each state.
Formally, given W
t
, W
t+1
, r
t+1
, the design of the eÆcient contract solves
the following problem: choose S
t
(), K
t+1
(), B
t
(), R
t+1
() to maximize
entrepreneur 's expected utility
EU() = U
1
[W
t
() +B
t
() K
t+1
()  S
t
()]+[1  p(K
t+1
())]V
2
[r
t+1
S
t
()]
+p(K
t+1
())V
2
[r
t+1
S
t
() + f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
()  R
t+1
()B
t
()]
subject to
p(K
t+1
())R
t+1
() = r
t+1
(7)
We will omit the index  in what follows, to lighten notation.Write the
Lagrangian
L = EU +  [p(K
t+1
)R
t+1
 R
t+1
]
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The rst order conditions are:
(i) w.r.t. S
t
 U
0
1
(C
t
) + rpV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
+ r(1  p)V
0
2
h
C
oB
t+1
i
= 0 (8)
(ii) w.r.t. K
t+1
 U
0
1
(C
t
) + p
0
V
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
+ pV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
f
0
((W
t+1
))  p
0
V
2
h
C
oB
t+1
i
+ p
0
R
t+1
= 0
(9)
(iii) w.r.t. B
t
U
0
1
+R
t+1
pV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
= 0 (10)
(iv) w.r.t. R
t+1
pV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
B
t
  p = 0 (11)
From (9), (10) and (7):
rpV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
+ r(1  p)V
0
2
h
C
oB
t+1
i
= R
t+1
pV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
= rV
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
It follows that V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
i
= V
0
2
h
C
oB
t+1
i
, hence
C
oG
t+1
= C
oB
t+1
: (12)
In other words, second period consumption is independent of the state of
nature. This is a standard result: the consumer is given complete insurance.
We state this result as lemma 1:
Lemma 1: The consumer is provided with full insurance.
Lemma 2: The eÆcient contract implies that for each entrepreneur, the
ratio of the loan to the amount of capital invested in the risky project is equal
to the ratio of (ex-post) marginal product of capital to the gross interest rate
on the risky loan:
B
t
K
t+1
=
f
0
((W
t+1
))
R
t+1
(13)
Proof: Use (12).
We now characterize the relationship between the safe rate of return r
t+1
and the expected marginal product of capital. To this end, let us dene the
elasticity of success probability with respect to capital, which we call \success
elasticity" for short:
(K) 
Kp
0
(K)
p(K)
9
Assumption A1: The \success elasticity" lies within the open interval
( 1; 0) for all K > 0 :
 1 < (K) < 0:
Remark: Asssumption A1 implies that 1 + (K
t+1
) > 0 for all K > 0:
As K tends to zero, p
0
(K)K tends to zero if p
0
(0) is nite. If (0) = 0,
assumption A1 implies that 
0
(0) > 0.
As an example, consider the function
p(K) =

1 +K
(14)
then
0 > (K) =  
K
1 +K
>  1
Thus Assumption A1 is satised.
We obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3: Given W
t+1
and the safe rate of return r
t+1
, the eÆcient
contract species a unique investment amount K
t+1
. This amount equates
the expected rate of return, modied by the success elasticity, to the safe
rate of return:
r
t+1
= p(K
t+1
)f
0
((W
t+1
)) [1 + (K
t+1
)] (15)
Thus, under assumption A1, the safe rate of return is smaller than the ex-
pected rate of return.
Proof: From (12), (9), (10) and (11)
r
t+1
= pf
0
((W
t+1
)) +B
t
R
t+1
p
0
(16)
From (13) and (16), we get
r
t+1
= pf
0
+Kp
0
f
0
(17)
which gives (15)
Notice that, under Assumpion A1, the safe rate of return r
t+1
is positive:
Lemma 4: Regardless of the values of W
t+1
and of r
t+1
, in an eÆcient
contract, the ratio of of investment in the risky project to the the amount of
loan is always equal to 1 plus the success elasticity.
Proof: from (15) and (7),
R
t+1
= f
0
((W
t+1
)) [1 + (K
t+1
)]
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This equation and (13) give
K
t+1
B
t
= 1 + (K
t+1
) (18)
Remark: Since  1 <  < 1, (18) implies B
t
> K
t+1
if K
t
> 0. This
may seem at rst surprising: The FIs lend to the entrepreneur more than
what he actually \needs" for the risky investment project
4
. Upon reection,
the excess of B
t
over K
t+1
being used to invest in the safe asset, this ensures
that the second period consumption of an entrepreneur in the event of failure
is greater than the second period consumption he would have if he were to
choose not to be an entrepreneur. (Note that because of the assumption of
full observability, there is no moral hazard here.)
Condition (18) implies that B
t
can be expressed as a function of K
t+1
:
B
t
= B
t
(K
t+1
) =
K
t+1
1 + (K
t+1
)
(19)
Dene
Z
t
= B
t
(K
t+1
) K
t+1
 Z(K
t+1
) (20)
The variable (Z
t
) plays a key role in our set-up because it is the source
of the income eect that causes endogenous cycles and uctuations. We will
show below that this eect is operative whenever intermediaries observe and
control K but not otherwise. Hence, the source of non-linear uctuations
can be attributed to nancial contracts written with an active intermediary.
Let us now turn to the amount invested in the safe asset. Making use of
(20) and lemmas 1 to 4 above, we can simplify condition (8) as
 U
0
1
[W
t
+ Z
t
  S
t
] + r
t+1
V
0
2
[r
t+1
S
t
] = 0 (21)
This equation yields S
t
as a function of W
t
, r
t+1
and Z
t
S
t
= S [W
t
; r
t+1
; Z
t
]
with derivatives
@S
@W
t
=
1

U
00
1
> 0;   U
00
1
+ (r
t+1
)
2
V
00
2
< 0;
4
This is due the assumption that p
0
< 0: the more an entrepreneur invests, the greater
is the probability of failure, even though the return is greater if he succeeds.( Note the
importance of the assumption that that p
0
< 0: If, on the contrary, p
0
> 0, then we would
have B
t
< K
t+1
.)
11
@S
@Z
t
=
1

U
00
1
> 0
and
@S
@r
t
=  
1

h
V
0
2
+ C
o
t+1
V
00
2
i
which is positive, zero, or negative, according to whether the second period
elasticity of marginal utility,  C
t+1
V
00
2
=V
0
2
is smaller than, equal to, or greater
than unity.
4 Dynamics under active nancial intermedi-
ation
We are now ready to study the dynamics of the model. We require that the
nancial market be in equilibrium, therefore the deposits S
t
in the FIs must
be equal to the loans the FIs make to entrepreneurs:
S [W
t
; r
t+1
; Z
t
] = B
t
(22)
We now express the left-hand side of (22) as a function of K
t
and K
t+1
and its right-hand side as a function of K
t+1
. This will give us a rst order
dierence equation in K, from which we can examine stationary states and
their stability properties.
From (6) and (1),
W
t
= 
0 1
[p(K
t
)K
t
] = f [p(K
t
)K
t
]  f
0
[p(K
t
)K
t
] [p(K
t
)K
t
]   (K
t
) (23)
(Note that if (4) is assumed, then  (K
t
) = (1   ) [p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
]

and
 
0
(K
t
) = (1   ) [p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
]
 1
[p
0
(K
t
)K
t
+ p(K
t+1
)] > 0 by Assumption
A1.)
From (15) and (6),
r
t+1
= p(K
t+1
)f
0
[p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
] [1 + (K
t+1
)]  (K
t+1
) (24)
Thus (22) can be written as
S [ (K
t
); (K
t+1
); Z(K
t+1
)] = B
t
(K
t+1
) (25)
This rst order dierence equation constitutes the dynamics of the model.
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If U
0
1
(0) = V
0
2
(0) =1, thenK = 0 is a steady state. (Note thatB
t
(0) = 0,
 (0) = 0, and Z(0) = 0). With K = 0, there is no output, no income, and
zero investment in the safe asset. There may exist several interior steady
states. From (25) we obtain the slope
dK
t+1
dK
t
=
 S
W
 
0
(K
t
)
S
Z
[B
0
(K
t+1
)  1] + S
r

0
(K
t+1
)  B
0
(K
t+1
)
(26)
where, due to Assumption A1,
 
0
(K
t
) =
dW
t
dx
t
dx
t
dK
t
=
1

0
[p
0
(K
t
)K
t
+ p(K
t
)] > 0
Thus the numerator of the right-hand side of (26) is positive. The denomi-
nator is ambiguous in sign, because
5
B
0
(K
t+1
) =
1
[1 + (K
t+1
)]
2
[(1 + ) K
t+1

0
] (27)

0
(K
t+1
) = p
0
(K
t+1
)f
0
[p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
] [1 + (K
t+1
)] +
p(K
t+1
)f
00
[p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
] [p
0
(K
t
)K
t
+ p(K
t
)] [1 + (K
t+1
)] +
p(K
t+1
)f
0
[p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
] 
0
(28)
The rst two terms on the right-hand side of (28) are negative, and, when-
ever 
0
< 0, the third term is also negative. On the other hand, if 
0
> 0,
then we cannot determine the sign of 
0
(K
t+1
). And even if S
r
= 0, the de-
nominator of the right-hand side of (26) is ambiguous in sign. It follows that
there may exist points at which the denominator of (26) changes sign, i.e.,
the locus of points (K
t
; K
t+1
) that satisfy (25) may well be a correspondence
6
K
t+1
= (K
t
): for a given K
t
there may exist more than one values of K
t+1
.
If K
t+1
= (K
t
) is a correspondence and the denominator of (26) changes
sign only once, then, in view of the fact that the numerator of (26) does not
5
Since we have assumed that, for positive K, 1 > 1 +  > 0, it follows that B is
always positive and greater than K for all K > 0. Thus it is not possible to have and
B
0
(K
t+1
) < 0 for all K; nevertheless, it is possible that B
0
(K
t+1
) < 0 over some intervals
where 
0
is positive and suÆciently great.)
6
If (:) is in fact a correspondence, the system is said to exhibit \indeterminacy": for a
given K
t
, the next period capital stock K
t+1
may take on several values, depending on the
expectation about W
t+1
. Multiple equilibria and self-fullling expectations are features of
many economic models (see, for example, Roger E. A. Farmer's book, \Macroeconomics
of self-fullling prophecies", 1999).
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change sign, we can construct a U-shaped curve K
t
= G(K
t+1
): Then G(:)
represents the backward dynamics of this economy.
Lemma 5: The curve K
t
= G(K
t+1
) changes sign only if there exists a
point where
S
Z
[B
0
(K
t+1
)  1] + S
r

0
(K
t+1
) B
0
(K
t+1
) = 0 (29)
Remark: In the case S
r
= 0, condition (29) holds if and only if there
exists a point K
C
t+1
such that
B
0
(K
C
t+1
) =  
U
00
1
[(K
C
t+1
)]
2
V
00
2
(30)
This is possible only if B
0
(K
C
t+1
) < 0 (i.e., K
C
t+1

0
(K
C
t+1
) > 1 + (K
C
t+1
) > 0.
Example 1: Let U
1
= aC
y
t
 (b=2)
2
(C
y
t
)
2
and V
2
= lnC
o
t+1
(=ln(r
t+1
S
t
).)
Then S
r
= 0 and, in view of the equilibrium condition (25), the condition
(30) is simply:
B
0
(K
C
t+1
) =  bB(K
C
t+1
)
(recall that S
t
= B
t
in equilibrium.)
Example 2: Recall the rst order condition
 U
0
1
[W
t
+B
t
 K
t+1
  S
t
] + r
t+1
V
0
2
[r
t+1
S
t
] = 0 (31)
and the market clearing condition
S
t
= B
t
(K
t+1
) (32)
Instead of solving (31) for S
t
= S [W
t
; r
t+1
; Z
t
] and substituting into (32), we
can subsitute (32) into (31). This gives
U
0
1
[W
t
 K
t+1
] = r
t+1
V
0
2
[r
t+1
B
t
(K
t+1
)]
hence
U
0
1
[ (K
t
) K
t+1
] = (K
t+1
)V
0
2
[(K
t+1
)B
t
(K
t+1
)] (33)
which yields the rst order dierence equation for our system. If U
1
= lnC
y
and V
2
= lnC
o
, then the dierence equation (33) simplies to
 (K
t
) = K
t+1
+B
t
(K
t+1
)  (K
t+1
) =
"
2 + 
1 + 
#
K
t+1
(34)
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(It is easy to verify that , if p(K)K tends to zero as K tends to zero, and ifW
tends to zero as x tends to zero, then (34) has (0; 0) as a stationary point.)
Since  (K
t
) is monotone increasing in K
t
and Z(K
t+1
) is a non-monotone
function in K
t+1
, we obtain the function
K
t
=  
 1
[(K
t+1
)]  G(K
t+1
).
The function G(:) has the inverted U shape if (K
t+1
) does. In such
cases, by a suitable choice of the function  (via the choice of the production
function), we can ensure that the map G(K
t+1
) generates chaotic behavior
for the backward dynamics. (See Appendix 1 for a precise statement on
chaotic equilibria.) We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Chaotic behavior is possible if the function G(:) has the
inverted U shape. For this to hold, it is necessary that the condition stated
in lemma 5 be satised.
Remark: We can derive futher properties of the G(:) function in example
2. From (34)
 
0
(K
t
)
dK
t
dK
t+1
=
"
2 + 
1 + 
#
+K
t+1

0
(1 + )
2
At (K
t+1
; K
t
) = (0; 0), the slope dK
t
=dK
t+1
= 2= 
0
(0) = 0.. Thus, the
stationary point (K
t+1
; K
t
) = (0; 0) is unstable in backward dynamics, and
stable in forward dynamics. Note that G
0
(:) changes sign once if and only if
there exists a unique value K
C
t+1
> 0 at which
h
1 + 

K
C
t+1
i h
2 + 

K
C
t+1
i
= K
C
t+1

0

K
C
t+1

(35)
5 Comparison with passive nancial interme-
diation
Under \passive intermediation", the FI that lends to entrepreneur  in period
t does not know how much capital the entrepreneur  actually invests in the
risky project. It does know, in period t+1, whether the project is successful
(i.e., the return from the project is positive), or not (the return is zero.) In the
case of success, the entrepreneur pays back to the FI the amount R
t+1
B
t
(),
and in the case of failure, he pays nothing. We assume that the FIs know
the aggregate (i.e., economy-wide) level of investment in the risky projects,
15
which we denote by K
A
t+1
(where the superscript A stands for \aggregate").
They can therefore deduce the average rate of non-default, p
A
(K
A
t+1
).
Since K
t+1
() is not observed by the FI, the gross rate of interest R
t+1
that the FI charges entrepreneur  is independent of his action. Since the
FIs break even in equilibrium, we have
p
A
(K
A
t+1
)R
t+1
= r
t+1
(36)
where r
t+1
is the rate the FIs pay to their depositors.
The entrepreneur  chooses S
t
(), K
t+1
(), B
t
() to maximize his expect-
ed utility:
EU = U
1
[C
y
t
()] + p (K
t+1
())V
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
+ [1  p (K
t+1
())]V
2
h
C
oB
t+1
()
i
(37)
where
C
y
t
() = W
t
+B
t
() K
t+1
()  S
t+1
() (38)
C
oG
t+1
() = r
t+1
S
t
() + f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
()  R
t+1
B
t
() (39)
and
C
oB
t+1
() = r
t+1
S
t
() (40)
Notice that the variable R
t+1
is not indexed with  because the FI's loan
contract does not specify K
t+1
().
We now substitute (38), (39) and (40) into (37), and dierentiate the
resulting expression with respect to S
t
(), K
t+1
(), B
t
().We then obtain
the following rst order conditions. With respect to B
t
() :
U
0
1
= p (K
t+1
())V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
R
t+1
(41)
with respect to S
t
() :
U
0
1
= p (K
t+1
())V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
r
t+1
+
[1  p (K
t+1
())]V
0
2
h
C
oB
t+1
()
i
r
t+1
(42)
with respect to K
t+1
() :
U
0
1
= p (K
t+1
())V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
f
0
((W
t+1
))+
p
0
(K
t+1
())
h
V
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
  V
2
h
C
oB
t+1
()
ii
(43)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs behave identically, hence
p (K
t+1
()) = p
A
(K
A
t+1
)
This equation and (36) implies that (41) may be rewritten as
U
0
1
= V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
r
t+1
(44)
From (44) and (42), we get
V
0
2
h
C
oG
t+1
()
i
= V
0
2
h
C
oB
t+1
()
i
(45)
hence
C
oG
t+1
() = C
oB
t+1
() = r
t+1
S
t
() (46)
implying that old-age consumption is independent of the state of nature.
That is, the consumer is perfectly insured. Thus risk-averse agents shift the
entire investment risk to the risk-neutral FIs. Equation (46) implies that
f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
() = R
t+1
B
t
() (47)
Now, (44) and (43) imply that
r
t+1
= p (K
t+1
()) f
0
((W
t+1
)) (48)
Thus, we obtain:
Lemma 6: Under passive nancial intermediation, the safe rate of return
r
t+1
is equal to the expected rate of return in the risky projects.
Remark: This result is in sharp contrast with Lemma 3.
Lemma 7: Under passive nancial intermediation, in equilibrium, the
amount each entrepreneur invests in the risky project is equal to the the
amount he borrows, i.e., K
t+1
= B
t
.
Proof: Multiply (47) by p to get
pR
t+1
B
t
() = pf
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
()
This and (36) give
r
t+1
B
t
() = pf
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
() (49)
From (49) and (48)
B
t
() = K
t+1
(): (50)
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Remark: This result is in sharp contrast with Lemma 4.
We now turn to the dynamics of the model. From (44) and (46), we have
U
0
1
= r
t+1
V
0
2
[r
t+1
S
t
] (51)
Now, in a symmetric equilibrium, S
t
= B
t
. Using this and (50), we get
S
t
= K
t+1
. Substitute this result into (51) to obtain
U
0
1
[W
t
 K
t+1
] = p(K
t+1
)f
0
((W
t+1
))V
0
2
[p(K
t+1
)f
0
((W
t+1
))K
t+1
] (52)
Since (6) remains true, (23) is still valid in this section. Thus (52) may
be written as
U
0
1
[ (K
t
) K
t+1
] = p(K
t
)f
0
(p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
)V
0
2
[p(K
t+1
)f
0
(p(K
t+1
)K
t+1
)K
t+1
]
(53)
This rst order dierence equation gives us the dynamics of the model.
In the case of log utility, it reduces to
1
 (K
t
) K
t+1
=
1
K
t+1
This yields K
t+1
= H(K
t
) where H is monotone increasing. Therefore uc-
tuations are impossible. We can now state:
Proposition 2: With the log utility function, it is impossible to have
chaotic dynamic behavior in the passive nancial intermediation regime.
6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the possibility of endogenous uctuations caused by ac-
tivities of nancial intermediaries within the context of a simple overlapping
generations model. Risk-averse agents face idiosyncratic income losses, the
probability of which they can aect through their own capital investments.
We showed that in the economy with active intermediaries, the optimal loan
contract achieves complete risk sharing but, given the loan size, the amount
invested in the risky project is lower in the presence of active intermediaries
than otherwise. This last fact alone creates an income eect which is re-
sponsible for the endogenous generation of cycles and chaotic dynamics. The
analysis indicated that in the absence of active nancial intermediation, the
economy studied would not exhibit any complex dynamics.
18
It bears emphasis that all these results are derived within the context
of a complete information environment and without recourse to preference-
shocks a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In fact, were we to incorporate
unobservable liquidity shocks to preferences in our model, our results would
actually be strengthened. These shocks would then constitute another source
of distortions; consequently, old-age consumption would no longer be non-
stochastic in such a framework. Since our emphasis is on the role of active
intermediation in the creation of chaos, there is no point in compounding
sources of complex dynamics.
Casual empiricism would suggest that richer countries (arguably these
are countries with the most developed nancial systems) are subject to more
(possibly more violent) cyclical uctuations than poorer countries. If one
makes the speculative connection that the active intermediation regime dis-
cussed above reects those that are present in the richer countries, then our
analysis, several caveats notwithstanding, may be interpreted as providing a
partial explanation for this observation.
A caveat needs to be recorded. The set-up studied above assumed that
capital investments by agents were perfectly observable to any other agent.
Also, the riskiness of each project was the same. In other words, problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection were assumed away. Doubtless these
omissions are glaring departures from reality. However, to make a theoretical
point, we nd it neater to avoid unnecessary complexity.
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Appendix 1: Chaotic Equilibria
Let X be a closed and convex subset of the real number line. Let G be a
continuous function that mapsX intoX. The pair (X;G) is called a dynamic
system. Let G
n
denote the nth iterate of G. A point k

is called a periodic
point of (X;G) with period m (where m is an integer), if G
m
(k

) = k

but
G
n
(k

) 6= k

for n = 1; 2; :::; m   1:The point k

is then said to generate
period-m cycles.
A subset Y of X is called a scrambled set of the dynamic system (X;G)
if Y has the following properties:
(a) Y has an uncountable number of points,
(b) Y does not contain any periodic points of the dynamic system (X;G);
(c) for any u; v 2 Y , where u 6= v;
lim
i!1
sup kG
i
(u) G
i
(v)k > 0 and lim
i!1
inf kG
i
(u) G
i
(v)k = 0;
(d) for any periodic point k

2 X and any u 2 Y
lim
i!1
sup kG
i
(u) G
i
(k

)k > 0.
If a dynamic system (X;G) has a scrambled set, we say that the dynamic
system is chaotic.
Property (d) means that the orbit generated by any point in the scrambled
set does not converge to a limit cycle. Property (c) means that any two points
from the scrambled set will generate two paths that will eventually get very
close together in one sense, yet remain far apart, in another sense.
The following theorem by Li and York (1975) states the connection be-
tween chaos and the existence of period 3 cycles:
Theorem: If there is a point x 2 X such that
G
3
(x)  x < G(x) < G
2
(x) or G
3
(x)  x > G(x) > G
2
(x) (54)
then (i) for every positive integer m, there is a periodic point of period m,
(ii) there is a scrambled set Y in X.
Clearly, we can apply this theorem to our model. The set X of feasible
capital stock levels can be made bounded by stipulating that p(K) = 0 for
20
K 

K ( a certain positive stock level). The inequalities (54) given in the
theorem can be met by appropriate restrictions on the p(:) function.
Appendix 2: Example of chaotic dynamic system
By suitable specication of the p(:) function, it is possible to generate
a logistic map. The logistic map k
t+1
= k
t
(1   k
t
); where 0 <   4
and k 2 [0; 1], can generate chaotic dynamic by an appropriate choice of
 (Devaney, 1986, Rasband, 1990). This equation has a unique positive
stationary solution

k. If  2 (4  2
p
2; 3) then all trajectories starting from
a positive k
0
converge to

k. This convergence exhibits damped oscillations if
2 <  < 3. At  = 3 the steady state loses its stability and a stable period
2 cycle is born. This is the beginning of the period-doubling route to chaos,
which culminates at   3:57. Beyond this value, there exist parameter
regions with completely chaotic behavior. The set of parameter values for
which the map generates chaotic trajectories has positive Lebesgue measure.
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